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CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:
SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Wilson R. Huhn*
constantly looked to,
constantly labored for,
and even though never perfectly attained,
constantly approximated . . . .1
In 1988, renowned historian Edmund S. Morgan published Inventing the People:
The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America.2  In that brilliant and
wide-ranging book Morgan traces how, between the time of the English Civil War
in the mid-seventeenth century and the adoption of the American Constitution in 1787,
the idea of “popular sovereignty”—the right of the people to govern themselves—
replaced the notion of “the divine right of kings” as the acknowledged source of
political power.3  The central theme of Morgan’s work is that while popular sover-
eignty is a “fiction” in the sense that the people of a nation cannot actually rule them-
selves without creating a government,4 over the centuries our ancestors constantly
labored to create a society and a government which gradually came closer to the
realization of that principle—a closer approximation of the ideal of popular sover-
eignty.5  At the end of Inventing the People, Morgan concludes:
* C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; B.A.
Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977. I wish to thank my colleagues, Tracy
Thomas, Elisabeth Reilly, and Richard Aynes, for their valuable comments and suggestions,
and my research assistant, Joshua Dean, for his untiring efforts. This research was funded with
a summer fellowship from The University of Akron School of Law.
1 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), reprinted in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 406 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter
COLLECTED WORKS] (referring to the “standard maxim for free society” that “all men are
created equal”).
2 EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
3 See id. at 54 (“[T]he paths taken in both England and America were first laid out in
seventeenth-century England when Parliament challenged the king and replaced divine right
with the sovereignty of the people.”); id. at 255–56 (summarizing the work of the Levelers,
John Locke, and other English citizens from that era who developed the principle of popular
sovereignty).
4 See id. at 13 (“Government requires make-believe.”).
5 See id. at 152 (“The history of popular sovereignty in both England and America after
1689 can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the
facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very
structure of society.”).
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From its inception in the England of the 1640s the sovereignty
of the people had been filled with surprises for those who invoked
it.  It was a more dynamic fiction than the one it replaced, more
capable of serving as a goal to be sought, never attainable, always
receding, but approachable and worth approaching.  It has contin-
ually challenged the governing few to reform the facts of political
and social existence to fit the aspirations it fosters.  The presump-
tion that social rank should convey a title to political authority was
only the first casualty in its reformations, and we have not yet
seen the last.  The fiction endures. The challenge persists.6
The principle of popular sovereignty is what distinguished the new American
republic from every other nation which preceded it in human history.7  Popular sov-
ereignty remains the single most important animating principle of American consti-
tutional law.  But the concept of popular sovereignty is not a simple, unitary idea;
instead, it comprises a number of interrelated and mutually reinforcing elements. 
In particular, the American conception of popular sovereignty embraces the follow-
ing seven fundamental principles:
1. The Rule of Law.  The people are sovereign and their will is expressed
through law.  The Constitution is ordained and established as law—the
supreme law of the land.
2. Limited Government.  The people are sovereign, not the government. 
By adopting the Constitution the people created the government, imposed
limits upon its power, and divided that power among different levels
and branches.
3. Inalienable Rights.  Every individual person is sovereign in the sense
that he or she retains certain inalienable rights, which the government
is bound to respect.
4. Equal Political Rights.  Each person is a sovereign political actor;
therefore each person has an equal right to participate in government. 
Accordingly, the Constitution protects freedom of political expression,
freedom of political association, the equal right to vote, and the principle
of majority rule.
5. Separation of Church and State.  The people are sovereign, not God. 
Laws reflect the will of the people, not the presumed will of God. 
6 Id. at 306.
7 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 761
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, Central Meaning] (referring to the people’s adoption of the
Constitution of the United States as “the most participatory, majoritarian (within each state)
and populist event that the planet Earth had ever seen”).
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Religious authority is not a legitimate basis to support the enactment or
interpretation of any law or the adoption of any official practice.
6. The Power of the National Government Over the States.  The American
people are sovereign, not the states.  No state has the power to secede
from the union or to nullify any federal law.  The states retain only those
powers not granted to the federal government or reserved to the people.
7. National Independence and the Limited Authority of International Law. 
The American people as a whole are sovereign and independent and are
not subject to any foreign law or power.  The political representatives
of the American people have the power to abrogate treaties or other
forms of international law.
Over the centuries each of these constitutional principles has blossomed and
borne fruit.  As Morgan predicted, the principle of popular sovereignty in all of its
manifestations has continued to change and develop, resulting in profound changes
in the interpretation of the Constitution.8
Part I of this article defines the meaning of the term “sovereignty” generally. 
Part II describes how the concept of popular sovereignty was understood in America
at the time of the founding and during the antebellum period, particularly as it found
expression in the Declaration of Independence and the speeches of Abraham Lincoln. 
Part III of this article discusses the seven principles which are implicit in the American
concept of popular sovereignty, and how the evolving nature of our understanding
of these principles has affected the interpretation of the Constitution down to the
present day.
I. THE MEANING OF “SOVEREIGNTY”
I use the term “sovereignty” to mean “the right to rule.”9  I refer to sovereignty
as a “right” because sovereignty is more than the mere possession or exercise of
power.  When the people of a society regard their ruler as a sovereign, if that ruler
is deposed the people still consider that person to be the rightful ruler.10  For that
reason, and not because of the former leader’s virtues or for reasons of political
expediency, the people may attempt to restore the former ruler to power.  Sover-
eignty is a psychological and sociological determinant which affects the political life
of the nation.
People of different societies may profoundly disagree in their understanding of
where sovereignty resides.  Over time and in different places people have held wildly
8 See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 283 (2005) [herein-
after Zick, Are the States Sovereign?] (“[S]overeignty has never in fact been the bright line
Classicists embrace. It is, rather, a still-evolving concept that admits of no easy definition.”).
9 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 27 (2003) (“When Americans debated
sovereignty before the Civil War, they were debating the ultimate locus of political authority.”).
10 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 5–6 (2d ed. 1914); MORGAN, supra
note 2, at 18.
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divergent opinions about the ultimate source of political power.  People in some
societies have believed that the right to rule is determined by the will of God.11  In the
past, monarchs rested their claim to power upon “the divine right of kings.”12  Even
in the present day, the Saudi royal family and the Supreme Leader of Iran contend that
they are entitled to rule because they uniquely represent and defend Islamic principles.13 
In other societies sovereignty is thought to arise from superior knowledge or adher-
ence to a “true” political philosophy.  For example, in some countries the Communist
Party has based its claim to the leading role in society14 upon the premise that it
possesses a superior understanding of history and economics.15  In the United States,
however, all just powers of government are derived “from the consent of the gov-
erned,”16 a principle which is known as “popular sovereignty.”17  As mentioned above,
11 See FIGGS, supra note 10, at 5–6 (discussing the theory of the divine right of kings).
12 See J. C. D. CLARKE, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1688–1832: RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS
DURING THE ANCIEN REGIME 86–87 (1985); MORGAN, supra note 2, at 18.
13 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures
or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 364 (1994) (referring to “Iran’s
theocracy” and the fact that Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law endorses “the divine right of Saudi
kingship”); Neil Shevlin, Velayat-E Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The Implementation
of Theocracy, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 358, 365 (1998) (describing the influence of Ayatollah
Khomeini’s teaching that “there should be no distinction between religion and government
in an Islamic state” on the Iranian Constitution).
14 See XIANFA pmbl. (2004) (China) (referring to “the people’s democratic dictatorship”
which in effect grants control to the Communist Party); JOSEONMINJUJU-UI-INMINGONGHWAGUG
SAHOEJU-UI HEONBEOB [Constitution] art. 12 (1998) (N. Korea) (“The State shall adhere to
the class line, strengthen the dictatorship of people’s democracy and firmly defend the people’s
power and socialist system against all subversive acts of hostile elements at home and abroad.”);
KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 6 (“The leading and
guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organi-
sations and public organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”).
15 See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.): REPORT ON
THE PARTY PROGRAMME (Mar. 19, 1919), reprinted in 3 V.I. LENIN: SELECTED WORKS 152
(1967) (“[A]ll countries are on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy or from
bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. This is an absolutely inevitable course.”);
VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE: BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT
(1902), reprinted in 1 V.I. LENIN: SELECTED WORKS 104 (1967) (rejecting democratic methods
of reform in the belief that it would lead only to trade-unionism, and in particular rejecting
“freedom of criticism,” stating, “[t]hose who are really convinced that they have made progress
in science would not demand freedom for the new views to continue side by side with the old,
but the substitution of the new views for the old”); see also VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, EIGHTH
PARTY CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.): REPORT ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME (Mar. 18, 1919),
reprinted in 29 V.I. LENIN: COLLECTED WORKS 151 (1965) (threatening the middle peasants
and the petty bourgeoisie that if they join forces with the bourgeoisie, “we shall be obliged to
apply the measures of the proletarian dictatorship to you, too,”—that is, they “will be stood
against the wall”).
16 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
17 Nathan Tarcov, Popular Sovereignty (In Democratic Political Theory), in 3 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1426 (1986).
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Edmund Morgan has traced the growth and development of the idea of popular sov-
ereignty from its antecedents in England to its ultimate acceptance at the founding
of the United States.18
The term “sovereignty” has been the subject of much scholarly criticism.19  For
example, at the conclusion of a series of two articles perceptively critiquing how
courts and commentators have employed the concept of sovereignty, Professor Jack
N. Rakove states, “Sovereignty is too vague and anachronistic a term to allow us to
reason about anything more than our propensity to keep using it.”20
In one sense, Professor Rakove is right.  The term “sovereignty” does not refer
to a definite legal formula which can be syllogistically applied to resolve specific
questions of law.  However, even though sovereignty is not a precise legal doctrine,
I believe that Professor Rakove is wrong to dismiss the importance of the concept of
sovereignty, particularly with respect to constitutional analysis.  Sovereignty is a belief
system; it is a psychological or sociological construct that represents a society’s funda-
mental understanding of the proper source and allocation of political power.  In the
United States, the sovereignty of the people comprehends a welter of interlocking
values which include the rule of law, limited government, personal autonomy, the
democratic process, the separation of church and state, the reserved powers of the
States, and national identity.  Insofar as constitutional law represents the sum and
interplay of fundamental American political values, the concept of popular sovereignty
plays a valuable and important role in the interpretation of the Constitution.
Furthermore, because our society is organized on many levels, a theory of sov-
ereignty must be capable of explaining the allocation of power within and among
the different segments of society.  It is unrealistic or at least anachronistic to speak
of sovereignty as if a single individual or institution might claim the right to exercise
all power within a society.  Any theory of sovereignty must take into account the
allocation of political power among individuals, administrative agencies, political
subdivisions, the national government, foreign nations, and international bodies.  This
article describes how the concept of popular sovereignty has affected the interpretation
of the Constitution in all of those various contexts.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AT THE TIME OF THE FOUNDING AND IN THE
ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
Professor Morgan and other scholars have richly described how the concept of
popular sovereignty was germinated in the English Civil War and how it came to
18 See generally MORGAN, supra note 2.
19 See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 51 (1999).
20 Id. at 59; see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3
(1999) (referring to disagreement among scholars about the nature and significance of sover-
eignty, and stating, “This muddle in part reflects the fact that the term ‘sovereignty’ has been
used in different ways.”); id. (identifying four different categories of sovereignty for purposes
of international law: “international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic
sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty”).
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fruition in America during and after the Stamp Act crisis of 1765.21  In the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, Parliament deposed James II and installed in his place William III
and Mary II.22  In the Declaration of Right of 1689, Parliament overthrew the prin-
ciple of the divine right of kings and declared itself sovereign.23  However, as a
practical matter Parliament did not exercise authority over the American colonies.24 
The charters of the American colonies had been granted by the King, and during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the colonies had grown accustomed to governing
themselves by means of elected colonial legislatures operating under royal governors.25 
Even after the Glorious Revolution, Parliament was largely content to allow the King
to rule the colonies in this manner.26  When Parliament finally asserted itself in America
in the 1760s by enacting unpopular laws such as the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, the
colonists rebelled,27 asserting that Parliament lacked the power to regulate or to tax
them because the colonists were not represented in Parliament.28  However, the
colonists did not seek representation in Parliament;29 instead they sought the free-
dom to make their own laws.30
The Americans and the British failed to compromise their differences over these
matters in part because they held incompatible understandings about the nature and
location of sovereignty.31  The British considered sovereignty to be a single, unitary
21 See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 2, at 146–48.
22 See id. at 105–07 (describing the transfer).
23 See id. at 94–121 (describing the Glorious Revolution).
24 Id. at 122 (“[T]hose who settled England’s American colonies were building soci-
eties where the authority of England’s king was ostensibly undiluted by his unruly English
Parliament.”).
25 See id. at 122–30 (describing the development of the colonial legislatures).
26 See id. at 145 (“As long as the system worked, both sides could and did take considerable
pride in it . . . .”).
27 See id. at 239 (“The Americans’ quarrel with England began, as everyone knows, with
the attempt of Parliament to levy taxes on the colonists in the Sugar Act of 1764 and the
Stamp Act of 1765.”).
28 See id. at 213 (“Boston led the way in May 1764 when Samuel Adams opened his public
career as a revolutionary by drafting instructions for the Boston representatives, denouncing
the levying of taxes on colonies by Parliament.”); id. at 231 (“When Parliament undertook in
the 1760s and 1770s to bind the colonists with legislation contrary to their wishes, the colonists
had ready-made representative bodies to challenge the credentials of an English House of
Commons to speak for them.”); see also Circular Letter from the Select-Men of Boston to
the Gentlemen Select-Men of Charlestown (Sept. 14, 1876), available at http://www.masshist
.org/revolution/doc-viewer.php?item_id=259&mode=nav (“Taxes equally detrimental to the
Commercial interests of the Parent Country and her Colonies, are imposed upon the People,
without their Consent . . . .”).
29 See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 242 (“It was not that the colonists themselves wished
to be represented in Parliament.”).
30 See id. at 243 (“[T]hey were affirming, without at first being fully aware of what they
were doing, that the American colonies were different national communities from the one
that was represented in Parliament.”).
31 See John V. Jezierski, Parliament or People: James Wilson and Blackstone on the
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entity—the sole and original source of political power—and they thought that this
right to rule was incapable of being shared.32  According to Blackstone, there is in
every form of government “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority,
in which . . . the rights of sovereignty, reside.”33  Originally, the British considered that
this unitary and absolute sovereign authority resided in the King; after the Glorious
Revolution, they believed it was vested in Parliament.34  After the Stamp Act crisis of
1765, American colonists came to believe that sovereignty rested with the people rather
than Parliament,35 but there was another even more significant difference between the
British and American conceptions of sovereignty.  Americans held a much more com-
plex understanding of the notion of sovereignty than did the British.  This multi-faceted
American conception of popular sovereignty is described in the following section.
A. Popular Sovereignty at the Time of the Founding
The second sentence of the Declaration of Independence36 announces the funda-
mental principle that “all Men are created equal.”37  This statement had two important
implications for Americans of the founding generation.  First, no individual, at birth,
is entitled to possess more political power than any other individual.  Accordingly,
Americans were rejecting not only the divine right of kings, but the entire institution
Nature and Location of Sovereignty, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 95–100 (1971).
32 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *48–49 (asserting that in every form of
government there is “[A] supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which . . .
the rights of sovereignty, reside . . . . By the sovereign power . . . is meant the making of
laws . . . .”); id. at *156–57 (arguing against lodging sovereignty in the people as a whole,
and stating, “the power of parliament is absolute and without control”); see also JEFFREY
GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 1–8 (1999)
(describing the history of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty from the thirteenth century
onward, and defending the principle of parliamentary supremacy).
33 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *48–49.
34 See FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS
xii (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 2006) (“Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Parliament had been
recognized as the sovereign source of law within Britain.”).
35 See id. (“[T]he Revolution really began in the mid-1760s, when the colonists first argued
that Parliament had no authority to impose taxes or other laws on a people who sent no repre-
sentatives of their own to distant London.”); see also Jezierski, supra note 31, at 106.
36 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration states:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That
to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying
its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
37 Id.
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of the aristocracy.  The second immediate implication of the phrase “all Men are
created equal” was that the American people are equal to the British people, and that
as “one People”38 Americans were ready to assume their “separate and equal Station”39
among the nations of the world.  To the founders, equality meant both individual
freedom and national independence.
The second sentence of the Declaration also expresses the principle that all
persons “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”40  This is not
a mere sentiment; to the contrary, it was the sole justification offered for the institution
of government: “to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men.”41
Finally, the second sentence of the Declaration expressly declares the principle
of popular sovereignty: All “just Powers” of government are “deriv[ed] . . . from the
Consent of the Governed.”42  The founders described the circumstances under which
people have the right to form a new government:
[W]henever any form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends [to secure the people’s rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation
on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.43
The founders claimed that the systematic deprivation of the colonists’ rights by
the British Parliament and King justified the Revolution.  The final paragraph of
the Declaration44 constitutes an act of popular sovereignty.  The act of declaring
38 Id. para. 1. The Declaration states:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of nature’s God entitle
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
39 Id.
40 Id. para. 2.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. para. 32. The Declaration states:
WE, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America,
in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of
the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name, and by
Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and
Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, Free
and Independent States; that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the
British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and the
State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as
2010] CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 299
independence is taken “in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these
Colonies.”45
By declaring the former colonies to be “Free and Independent States,”46 this final
paragraph also lays the foundation for the principle of “state sovereignty.”  This para-
graph refers to the “united States of America,”47 (the word “united” is not capitalized)
and throughout the paragraph the colonies and states are referred to in the plural
form.48  The obvious implication is that the states are separate entities, not merely
part of a larger national entity.
Following the Revolution, Americans initially adopted a form of government
which recognized each state as sovereign.  The first Constitution for the United States
of America was the Articles of Confederation, a “firm league of friendship” among
the several states.49  It was entitled a confederation between the states,50 and, pursuant
to its terms, the representatives to the Continental Congress voted as states.51  The cen-
tral government was relatively weak; the Articles make no provision for a separate
executive or judicial branch of government,52 nor was Congress given any power to
impose direct taxes or regulate commerce among the states.53  Furthermore, the
Articles expressly provided that “[E]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confed-
eration expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”54
Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts
and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the sup-
port of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes
and our sacred Honor.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See id. (stating in reference to the colonies that “they are absolved from all Allegiance
to the British Crown,” that the political connection between “them” and the State of Great
Britain is dissolved, and in reference to the states, that “they have full Power to levy War,
conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do”).
49 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. III.
50 Id. (entitled, “[The] Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States
of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Georgia.”).
51 See id. art. V, § 4 (providing that “each State shall have one vote”).
52 See id. art. IX, § 5 (providing for the appointment of a “Committee of the States” to
exercise executive-like powers); id. at art. IX, § 2 (authorizing Congress to resolve disputes
among the states).
53 See id. art. IX, §§ 4–5.
54 Id. art. II.
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There are elements of the Articles of Confederation that militate against the
concept of “state sovereignty.”  The name of the country was now the “United States
of America”—unlike in the Declaration, the word “United” was capitalized,55 thus
implying that the United States was a single entity.  The Articles impose a number
of limitations on the states; limitations that are inconsistent with full sovereignty. 
For example, the states were forbidden to enter into treaties or engage in war with-
out the consent of Congress.56  Most significantly, the Articles of Confederation were
expressly made “perpetual.”57
However, the American people soon wearied of the “league of friendship” that
was the Articles of Confederation,58 and in 1788 they ratified the present Constitution
of the United States.59  The Constitution differs from the Articles of Confederation
in several fundamental respects that pertain to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
First, unlike the Articles, the Constitution is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by the
“People of the United States,”60 not by the States.  Second, the Constitution is intended
to be “a more perfect Union” than the Confederation.61  Third, the Constitution is
expressly created by the people for the purpose of “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity.”62  Fourth, the Constitution provides that it is “the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”63 
Fifth, and most significantly, there is no reference to the sovereignty of the states in
the Constitution.  In sum, the Constitution is a much closer approximation of popular
sovereignty than the Articles of Confederation.
B. Popular Sovereignty in the Conflict Over Slavery—a “People’s Contest”
During the antebellum period, the controversy over slavery rose to a crescendo,
tearing this nation apart.64  To a surprising extent, the debate was framed in terms of
55 Id. art. I.
56 See id. art. VI § 1, § 5.
57 Id. art. XIII (“And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by
every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be
made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States,
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”).
58 Id. art. III.
59 MARC LANDRY & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: BALANCING
DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS 39 (2d ed. 2008).
60 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
64 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 65–82 (2003).
2010] CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 301
“sovereignty,” but “sovereignty” appeared in several guises.  It is common knowl-
edge how the principle of “state sovereignty” was utilized in support of slavery to
justify nullification and secession,65 and how Daniel Webster rebutted those arguments
in his Second Reply to Hayne66 and the Seventh of March Speech.67  Less familiar is
how the principle of “popular sovereignty” was employed both in support of and in
opposition to slavery.
The term “popular sovereignty” was the slogan that Stephen Douglas used to
justify the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 which authorized each new state to decide
whether it would enter the Union as a slave or as a free state.68  Douglas gave the
following explanation for having sponsored this law: “My object was to secure the
right of the people of each State and of each Territory, North or South, to decide the
question for themselves, to have slavery or not, just as they chose . . . .”69  Douglas,
of course, did not believe that African-Americans should have a voice in the matter. 
Instead, he understood popular sovereignty to mean government “by the white man,
for the benefit of the white man, to be administered by white men, in such manner as
they should determine.”70
In 1857 the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford,71 which struck down
the Missouri Compromise that had excluded slavery from the northern portion of the
American territories.  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney stated
that “the people of the United States” are the political body who “form the sover-
eignty,” and noted that the central question in the case was whether blacks “compose
a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty.”72  Invok-
ing the interpretive principle of original intent, Taney concluded:
65 See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO THE S.C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (THE
S.C. EXPOSITION) (1828), as reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 531–33
(Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977) (arguing in favor of interposition and
state nullification of federal law); Senator John C. Calhoun, Final Remarks to the Senate of
South Carolina, A Warning to the North (Mar. 4, 1850), reprinted in THE CAUSES OF THE
CIVIL WAR 40–45 (Kenneth M. Stampp ed., 3d rev. ed. 1991) (warning that northern hostility
to slavery would lead to disunion).
66 Daniel Webster, Second Reply to Hayne (Jan. 26–27, 1830), reprinted in DANIEL
WEBSTER: “THE COMPLETEST MAN” 113–20 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed., 1999) (closing
with the words, “[l]iberty and Union, now and for ever, one and inseparable!”).
67 Daniel Webster, Seventh of March Speech (Mar. 7, 1850), reprinted in DANIEL
WEBSTER: “THE COMPLETEST MAN,” supra note 66, at 121 (ridiculing the idea of “Peaceable
secession! Peaceable secession!”).
68 Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Remarks to Public Reception in Chicago (July 9, 1858),
in POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
IN THE CELEBRATED CAMPAIGN OF 1858, at 5 (Columbus, Follett, Foster & Co. 1860) [herein-
after Douglas, Remarks].
69 Id. at 8.
70 Id. at 15.
71 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (finding that blacks, whether slave or free, were not citizens of the
United States).
72 Id. at 404.
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We think they are not [included within “the people of the United
States”], and that they are not included, and were not intended to
be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.73
Abraham Lincoln refuted both Douglas and Taney in their assertions that blacks
possessed neither individual nor political sovereignty.  On October 16, 1854, in his
famous speech at Peoria, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln responded to Douglas’s statement
that the principle of self-government was not applicable to blacks:
The doctrine of self-government is right—absolutely and
eternally right—but it has no just application, as here attempted. 
Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it has such just appli-
cation depends upon whether a negro is not or is a man.  If he is
not a man, why in that case, he who is a man may, as a matter of
self-government, do just as he pleases with him.  But if the negro
is a man, is it not to that extent, a total destruction of self-govern-
ment, to say that he too shall not govern himself?  When the white
man governs himself that is self-government; but when he governs
himself, and also governs another man, that is more than self-
government—that is despotism.  If the negro is a man, why then
my ancient faith teaches me that “all men are created equal;” and
that there can be no moral right in connection with one man’s
making a slave of another.74
Lincoln then drew a direct link between popular sovereignty and individual
sovereignty:
[N]o man is good enough to govern another man, without that
other’s consent.  I say this is the leading principle—the sheet an-
chor of American republicanism.  Our Declaration of Independence
says:
“We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are cre-
ated equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness.  That to secure these rights, governments are
73 Id.; see also Douglas, Remarks, supra note 68, at 21 (agreeing with Taney’s assessment).
74 Abraham Lincoln, Peoria Speech (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note
1, at 265–66 [hereinafter Lincoln, Peoria].
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instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.”75
Lincoln then took one more step in defining the relation between individual sov-
ereignty and popular sovereignty.  He asserted that, because no man has the power
to govern another man without that other’s consent, it follows that the law must also
treat all men equally and allow every person an equal voice in the government:
I have quoted so much at this time merely to show that accord-
ing to our ancient faith, the just powers of governments are derived
from the consent of the governed.  Now the relation of masters and
slaves is, pro tanto, a total violation of this principle.  The master
not only governs the slave without his consent; but he governs him
by a set of rules altogether different from those which he prescribes
for himself.  Allow all the governed an equal voice in the govern-
ment, and that, and that only is self government.76
According to Abraham Lincoln, the principles of liberty, equality, and self-
government are not competing principles; instead, they are mutually-reinforcing
aspects of the same underlying truth.  Stephen Douglas may have appropriated the
term “popular sovereignty,” but Lincoln embodied it.
In his speech on June 16, 1857, Lincoln responded to Taney’s and Douglas’s
assertions that the framers intended to exclude blacks from the phrase “all men are
created equal.”77  Lincoln noted that the Declaration was clear on this point—that
Taney and Douglas were “doing . . . obvious violence to the plain unmistakable lan-
guage of the Declaration.”78  He noted that the framers “defined with tolerable dis-
tinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal—equal in ‘certain
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’  This
they said, and this meant.”79  He then explained why the framers wrote the Declaration
so broadly as to include the entire human family:
They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which
should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to,
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained,
constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and
deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value
of life to all people of all colors everywhere.80
75 Id. at 266.
76 Id.
77 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 16, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 405–06.
78 Id. at 405.
79 Id. at 405–06.
80 Id. at 406.
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Four years later, at the commencement of the Civil War, Lincoln once again
invoked the principle of popular sovereignty, this time in opposition to secession.81 
Lincoln believed that people have a right to revolution, but it is not a legal right.  It is,
instead, a moral right, and their right to rebel or secede thus depends upon the legiti-
macy of the cause for which they are fighting.82  Slavery, of course, was an unjust
cause.83  Nor could the people of any democracy claim to have a legitimate right to
secede simply because they had lost an election; to accept such a proposition meant
that democracy itself was impossible.  Lincoln explained this principle in his address
to Congress on July 4, 1861:
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United
States.  It presents to the whole family of man, the question,
whether a constitutional republic, or a democracy—a govern-
ment of the people, by the same people—can, or cannot, maintain
its territorial integrity, against its own domestic foes.  It presents
the question, whether discontented individuals, too few in num-
bers to control administration, according to organic law, in any
case, can always, upon the pretences made in this case, or on any
other pretences, or arbitrarily, without any pretence, break up their
Government, and thus practically put an end to free government
upon the earth.84
In this speech Lincoln argued forcefully and at length against the notion of
state “sovereignty”85 and the legality of secession.86  He specifically contrasted the
81 President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—First Edition & Revisions (Mar. 4,
1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 253.
82 President Abraham Lincoln, Address to Congress (July 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 434 n.83 [hereinafter Lincoln, Congress] (“The right of revolution,
is never a legal right. The very term implies the breaking, and not the abiding by, organic law.
At most, it is but a moral right, when exercised for a morally justifiable cause. When exercised
without such a cause revolution is no right, but simply a wicked exercise of physical power.”).
83 Lincoln, Peoria, supra note 74, at 266 (“[T]here can be no moral right in connection
with one man’s making a slave of another.”).
84 Lincoln, Congress, supra note 82, at 426.
85 Id. at 434. Lincoln stated:
Much is said about the “sovereignty” of the States; but the word, even,
is not in the national Constitution; nor, as is believed, in any of the State
constitutions. What is a “sovereignty,” in the political sense of the term?
Would it be far wrong to define it “A political community, without a
political superior”? Tested by this, no one of our States, except Texas,
ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas gave up the character on coming
into the Union; by which act, she acknowledged the Constitution of the
United States, and the laws and treaties of the United States made in
pursuance of the Constitution, to be, for her, the supreme law of the land.
Id.
86 See id. at 434–40 (contending that secession is not permitted under the Constitution).
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Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the Union to the Declaration and
Constitution of the Confederacy:
Our adversaries have adopted some Declarations of Independence;
in which, unlike the good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit
the words “all men are created equal.”  Why?  They have adopted
a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which, un-
like our good old one, signed by Washington, they omit “We, the
People,” and substitute “We, the deputies of the sovereign and
independent States.”  Why?  Why this deliberate pressing out of
view, the rights of men, and the authority of the people?87
Ultimately, Lincoln said, the Civil War was “a People’s contest” that was being
waged to defend fundamental human rights:
This is essentially a People’s contest.  On the side of the
Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world, that form,
and substance of government, whose leading object is, to elevate
the condition of men—to lift artificial weights from all shoulders—
to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all—to afford all, an un-
fettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.88
Lincoln’s understanding of the Declaration led him to the conclusion that popular
sovereignty is not limited to the right to vote—and certainly not limited to one race of
man.  It is instead a complex amalgam of interlocking and mutually supporting values.
I suggest that popular sovereignty comprises at least seven separate ideals: the
rule of law, limited government, individual rights, equal political rights, separation of
church and state, limited state sovereignty, and national sovereignty.  These principles,
and the complex relation among them, are described below.
III. SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ARISING FROM THE CONCEPT OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Rule of Law
The first aspect of constitutional law that is derived from the principle of
popular sovereignty is simply that the Constitution is law: it is law because the
87 Id. at 438.
88 Id.
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people have the original right to create law,89 and the Constitution is just such a
constituent act.90
Not only is the Constitution a law, it is also “a superior, paramount law.”91 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution expressly provides that the Constitution is “the
supreme law of the land,”92 thus placing the Constitution at the pinnacle of the
hierarchy of American law.  This hierarchy is made necessary by the fact that the
American people have distributed power among different branches and levels of
government.  The people have created a national government as well as individual
states; in addition, there are legislative branches that enact statutes and ratify treaties,
executive branch agencies that issue regulations under the authority of statutes, and
courts that create the common law as well as interpret the written law.  The hierarchy
of American law is as follows:
United States Constitution
9
Treaties—Federal Statutes
9
Federal Regulations
9
Federal Common Law
9
State Constitutions
9
State Regulations
9
State Common Law
89 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (“That
the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as,
in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected.”).
90 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of the United States . . . do ordain and estab-
lish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (stating that the Constitution “is the voice of the whole American
people . . .”).
91 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, un-
changeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”); id. (“Certainly all those who
have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act
of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”).
92 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Obedience to the law is simply adherence to the will of the people—what
Rousseau called submission to the “general will.”93  At the beginning of his legal and
political career, Abraham Lincoln urged Americans to make obedience of the law
a “political religion”:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to
his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to
violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never
to tolerate their violation by others. . . .  Let reverence for the
laws . . . .  become the political religion of the nation . . . .94
Arguably the greatest challenge to the supremacy of the Constitution and the
authority of the Supreme Court during the 20th century was the Little Rock school
desegregation case, Cooper v. Aaron.95  After the Little Rock School Board adopted
a limited plan to integrate the city’s Central High School, the Governor of Arkansas
called out the National Guard to prevent black students from entering the school.96 
The Governor’s action was in direct defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education,97 and it increased public hostility to the integration
plan.98  When the Guard withdrew and the black children again attempted to attend
the school, they had to be withdrawn because of what the Supreme Court called a
“large and demonstrating crowd,”99 and what Peter Irons describes as “howling mobs”
of “racial bigots” who “circled the school.”100  In Cooper, the Supreme Court re-
affirmed Brown and declared that obedience to the Constitution is “indispensable for
the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us.”101 
The Court added “[o]ur constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made
a living truth.”102
93 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 81 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Classics 1968) (1762).
94 Abraham Lincoln, Address to Young Men’s Lyceum (Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 112.
95 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering the Little Rock School Board to desegregate the city’s
schools).
96 See id. at 11 (“On the morning of . . . September 4, 1957, the Negro children attempted
to enter the high school but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas National
Guard ‘acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the school
grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,’ as they
continued to do every school day during the following three weeks.”).
97 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official racial segregation of the public schools).
98 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10 (“[F]rom that date [of the Governor’s action] hostility to the
Plan was increased . . . [and became] more bitter and unrestrained.”).
99 Id. at 12.
100 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, at 250 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993).
101 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 20.
102 Id.
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The Rule of Law binds not only the states and the political branches of the
federal government, but the courts as well.  Once the Supreme Court has taken a
position on a fundamental point of constitutional law, it is reluctant to overturn such
a decision in the absence of special circumstances.103  In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,104 Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter jointly authored a plurality opinion in which they con-
sidered whether to reaffirm or overturn Roe v. Wade.105  They stated that if the Court
were to overrule Roe simply because of popular opposition to the decision it would
“seriously weaken . . . the rule of law.”106  They explained that people’s acceptance
of their decisions was dependent upon the belief that the Court’s rulings were
“grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to
make.”107  The Justices contended that the doctrine of stare decisis applies with even
stronger force “whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the con-
tending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” as it had in Roe.108  The Justices offered
two examples of cases where the Court had been justified in overruling major prece-
dent: West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,109 overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,110
and Brown v. Board of Education,111 overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.112  In each of
103 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (identifying four factors that should be taken into account in determining whether
to reaffirm or overrule a previous constitutional decision). The plurality stated that in making
this determination it was appropriate to consider:
[W]hether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of signifi-
cant application or justification.
Id. (citations omitted).
104 505 U.S. 833 (reaffirming the central holding of Roe v. Wade).
105 410 U.S. 113 (establishing the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy prior to
viability of the fetus).
106 Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (plurality opinion) (“[O]verruling Roe’s central holding would
not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously
weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme
Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.”).
107 Id. at 865–66.
108 Id. at 867.
109 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law).
110 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage law).
111 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official segregation of the public schools).
112 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state law requiring the segregation of the races in
railroad cars).
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those cases the Court came to the belief that the factual premises of the prior
decision simply were not true; changes in fact or changes in understandings of fact
necessitated a change in the interpretation of the Constitution.113
In the field of constitutional law the principle of the Rule of Law demands not
only the obedience of the citizenry, executive officers, and legislative bodies to the
dictates of the Constitution, but also the willingness of the Supreme Court to accord
appropriate respect to previous interpretations of the Constitution, particularly deci-
sions that purport to settle national controversies.
B. Limited Government
The second corollary that is derived from the axiom that the people are sovereign
is that the government is not sovereign.  In the United States, the people do not serve
the government; rather, the government serves the people.114  In Marbury v. Madison,115
the foundation case in constitutional law, Chief Justice John Marshall asked, “Is it
to be contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of their
country?”116  His answer, of course, was that public officials are subject to the law:
“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men.”117  The Court in Marbury found that even the President is under
the law.118  The Court stated that in adopting the Constitution the people of the
113 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–64 (discussing the overruling of Plessy and Adkins); id.
at 863 (“West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts,
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions.”).
114 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison) (“If we advert
to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people
over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”).
115 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle that laws that are in conflict
with the Constitution are void).
116 Id. at 164.
117 Id. at 163.
118 Id. at 167 (ruling that if a public official has been appointed for a term of years and there
is no provision permitting his removal by the President, then the President has no power to
remove that official). The Court stated:
If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a
new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights of the officer
are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to
have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently
if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President; the
rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable
by the President.
Id. at 167; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President Nixon
to turn over the Watergate tapes); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(declaring President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry unconstitutional).
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United States not only created a government, but they had placed upon that govern-
ment “certain limits not to be transcended.”119
Over time, the general powers of the federal government have greatly expanded,
typically during times of great crisis: the Civil War,120 the Great Depression,121 and
the Civil Rights Movement.122  The people have approved this expansion by repeatedly
enacting amendments to the Constitution vesting power in Congress to enact “appro-
priate legislation”123—a process that James McPherson refers to as the promotion of
“positive liberty.”124  However, the Constitution still constrains the government in
the exercise of those powers.125
An important feature of “limited government” under the Constitution is the
doctrine of Separation of Powers, which safeguards freedom by dividing govern-
mental power into different functions and distributing these functions among com-
peting branches of the government.126  As Madison says in The Federalist No. 51,
to prevent tyranny “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”127  Louis
119 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176. “This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish
certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States
is of the latter description.” Id.
120 See David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006)
(describing the far-reaching legislation enacted by Congress during the Civil War, and stating,
“the nonmilitary legislation of the Civil War years also reflected a veritable revolution in the
understanding of federal authority”).
121 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1253–62 (describing the expansion of federal power during the New Deal and the
Supreme Court’s response).
122 See id. at 1272–78 (describing expansion of regulatory power as a result of Great
Society programs).
123 For examples where Congress has been granted the power to enforce an amendment
by appropriate legislation, see U.S. CONST. amend. XII, §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5; U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI;
U.S. CONST. amend XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, §2;
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §2.
124 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION
62–63, 137–38 (1991) (drawing the distinction between “positive liberty” and “negative liberty,”
and defining “positive liberty” as “freedom to achieve a status of freedom previously denied
by disability or law”). But see DAVID KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, 481–83 (1996) (criticizing the Roosevelt administra-
tion for failing to secure a constitutional amendment expanding Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
126 But see Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly
Effected A Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689 (2006) (arguing that over
the past few decades the doctrine of separation of powers “has worked to shift power from
Congress to the federal judiciary”).
127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 246 (James Madison) (David Wooten ed., 2003); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 232 (James Madison) (David Wooten ed., 2003) (“The
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Brandeis echoed this view in his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States,128
where he stated:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power.  The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the dis-
tribution of the governmental powers among three departments,
to save the people from autocracy.129
Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy has stated that “[l]iberty is always at stake . . .
[in] the separation of powers.”130
The doctrine of Separation of Powers is of greatest importance in situations
where the country faces a crisis and the people are tempted to address the crisis by
concentrating governmental power in one branch or public officer.  For example, over
the years both the President and Congress have sought to control government spend-
ing by having one government official or institution assume responsibility for balanc-
ing the budget.131  However, the Supreme Court has ruled that neither the President,
nor the Congress, nor both branches acting together have the authority to alter the
Constitutional allocation of powers in this regard.  In Train v. New York, the Court
ruled that the President lacked statutory authority to impound funds to reduce the
deficit;132 in Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not
confer the power to balance the budget on the Comptroller General, an official within
the legislative branch;133 and in Clinton v. New York, the Court ruled that Congress
could not vest the power of the line item veto in the President.134  These measures
might have proven useful or efficient, but the Court ruled that they were inconsistent
with the system of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution.
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
128 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (ruling that the President has the exclusive power to remove officials
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate).
129 Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
130 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment.
The latter premise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches
seek to transgress the separation of powers.” (citations omitted)).
131 See, e.g., Richard A. Gephardt, The Congressional Budget Impasse, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 5 (1996) (describing the history behind and the events of the 1995–96 budget impasse).
132 Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (striking down the President’s impoundment
of funds allocated to the Environmental Protection Agency).
133 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
134 Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (striking down the Line Item Veto Act).
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In times of war the country faces even graver dangers, and people’s fear may lead
them to approve extraordinary measures.  The Alien and Sedition Act adopted during
the “silent war” with France;135 the decisions of military commanders under Lincoln
to close newspapers or imprison civilians accused of aiding the Confederacy;136 the
enactment and enforcement of the Espionage Act during World War I;137 the intern-
ment of Japanese-American citizens and resident aliens during World War II;138 the
President’s seizure of the steel industry during the Korean conflict;139 and the surveil-
lance of antiwar groups during the Vietnam War140 were all challenged as unconsti-
tutional, and in each instance the eventual judgment of history has been harsh.141  In
the course of the present War on Terror, lawyers for the Justice Department claimed
extraordinary power for the President to detain prisoners without trial and subject
them to cruel methods of interrogation.142  In four cases decided in the past six years,
135 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“[T]he great controversy
over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning
of the First Amendment.”); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52–117
(2000) (describing the adoption, enforcement, and reaction to the Alien and Sedition Acts);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939 (2009) (describing
limitations on freedom of speech during war at different times in American history); id. at
941–42 (discussing Alien and Sedition Acts).
136 See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 2 (1866) (striking down a person’s conviction
in military court for conspiring to overthrow the government, on the ground that the civil courts
were open); CURTIS, supra note 135, at 306–09 (describing measures taken during the Civil
War to stifle dissent); Stone, supra note 135, at 942–44.
137 See Stone, supra note 135, at 944–46 (describing the Espionage and Sedition Acts).
138 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding order excluding persons
of Japanese ancestry from the west coast during World War II); see also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995) (stating that the Court in Korematsu had “inexplicably”
upheld the exclusion order, and quoting Justice Murphy’s dissent characterizing the order as
the product of “racism”).
139 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(striking down action of the President taking control of the nation’s steel industry during the
Korean War).
140 See INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk.2, at 10–15 (1976) (describing the F.B.I.’s COINTELPRO
program and its concerted effort to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.); Stone, supra note
135, at 951–52; see also Jonathan D. Forgang, Note, “The Right of the People”: The NSA,
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans
Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 234 (2009) (summarizing facts leading to adoption of
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978).
141 See supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/pdf/OfficeofLegalCounsel_Aug2Memo_041609.pdf (approving waterboarding,
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the Supreme Court has ruled against the government and determined that suspected
terrorists are entitled to fair hearings to determine their status and their guilt.143  As
Justice Robert Jackson stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer:
The purpose of lodging dual titles [President and Commander in
Chief] in one man was to insure that the civilian would control
the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presi-
dential office.  No penance would ever expiate the sin against
free government of holding that a President can escape control
of executive powers by law through assuming his military role.144
The lesson is clear: even in time of war, the government is constrained by law.
C. Inalienable Rights
Even though the people have the right to create a government and to invest it with
various powers, our constitutional system also assumes that individuals retain an irre-
ducible portion of sovereignty, their inalienable rights.  As Alexander Bickel noted,
this involves a contradiction: how is it possible that the actions of a popularly elected
government founded upon the principle of popular sovereignty can be constrained
by the decisions of an unelected judiciary?145  The answer, of course, is that the people
also expect the Constitution to protect them in the exercise of their inalienable rights.
confinement of a prisoner in a small dark box with insects, and sleep deprivation, among
other techniques); see also Wilson Huhn, Waterboarding Is Illegal, WASH. U. L. REV.
COMMENTARIES (May 10, 2008), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/waterboarding-is
-illegal/. See generally Wilson Huhn Treatment of Detainees, WILSON HUHN: AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, https://sites.google.com/site/huhnconstitutionallaw/discussion/treatment
-of-detainees (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (collecting documents).
143 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (finding prisoner status hearings and
appeal mechanism in Military Commissions Act not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
proceedings); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding that procedures in war
crimes trials before military commissions fell short of requirements under Geneva Convention
and Uniform Code of Military Justice); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (finding Due
Process Clause applicable to prisoner status hearings); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(finding that federal district court has jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus proceeding involving
prisoner held in Guantanamo).
144 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 646.
145 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional
a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of
the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it.”); id. at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”).
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The theory of the social contract assumes that government arises from the con-
sent of sovereign individuals: in a state of nature, each person has the right to do with
himself as he pleases, but in joining or remaining in a society, a person agrees to cede
some of his natural sovereignty to the rulers of the community.146  The essential ques-
tion is, in entering into the social contract, how much sovereignty must each person
give up?147
Thomas Hobbes believed that individuals grant virtually all power to govern-
ment.148  Hobbes, a product of the English Civil War, feared political and social dis-
cord and was willing to trade liberty for security.149  The Framers of our Constitution
instead took inspiration from John Locke, a child of the Glorious Revolution,150 who
146 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 81–86 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1904) (1651). Hobbes described man’s condition in a state of nature as constant
warfare—the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Id. at 84; see also JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 101–06 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003)
(1690) (discussing the state of nature); ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 64–65 (explaining the
change from the state of nature to civil society).
147 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1,
39 (1999) (summarizing the uses of social contract theory in American case law, and conclud-
ing that social contract theory is ambiguous on the question of the proper balance between
governmental power and individual rights). Professor Allen states:
Social contract theory is too flexible to point with certainty in any one
direction, particularly where the right answer is a matter of controversy,
and particularly in the absence of detailed argument and analysis of the
sort associated with the discipline of academic philosophy rather than the
pragmatic discipline of law. As the examples of flexibility cited through-
out this article show, using the apparatus of social contract theory, one
can make the case for individual rights against government and likewise
the case for government authority over individuals.
Id.
148 See HOBBES, supra note 146, at 120.
149 See Gregory H. Fox, Strengthening the State, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 42
(1999) (“The great theorists of State consolidation, such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin,
wrote of domestic absolutism as a necessary response to conditions of pervasive disorder; the
English civil war in the case of Hobbes and the continental religious wars for Bodin.”).
150 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L.
REV. 525, 531 (2007). Professor Gaba states:
In 1690, after a return from exile in Holland following the suc-
cessful “Glorious Revolution,” Locke published the Two Treatises of
Government, his extraordinarily influential work of political philosophy.
Although there is some dispute over when each part was drafted, the
basic purposes of the Two Treatises—a refutation of the power of the
monarchy, a description of the legitimate basis for democratic govern-
ment and a justification for revolution against illegitimate government—
were closely tied to the currents of revolution that culminated in William
and Mary’s ascension to the throne.
Id.
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maintained that people are possessed of natural rights—rights that cannot be waived
because they are inherent.151  The Declaration of Independence expressly adopts
Locke’s position, stating that each person is endowed with “certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”152  Furthermore,
unlike Hobbes, the founders of our country believed that the purpose of government
was not to prevent discord, but to preserve freedom; the Declaration expressly states
that the purpose of government is “to secure these Rights,”153 and the Constitution
provides that one of its purposes is to “secure the blessings of liberty.”154
In the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,155 the Supreme Court explained the
relationship between the sovereignty of the government and the sovereignty of the
individual.156  While the people as a whole are sovereign,157 the rights to “life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness” are “individual possessions” which are “secured by . . .
maxims of constitutional law.”158
After 1937, the Supreme Court turned from the protection of property rights
to the protection of personal rights, greatly expanding the number and scope of
civil rights in myriad fields of constitutional law:159 procedural fairness,160 equal
151 See id. at 579. Gaba states:
John Locke, political philosopher and all around polymath, stands
as a central figure in the development of Western conceptions of prop-
erty rights and democratic institutions. If not the sole voice that is echoed
in the American revolution and the Constitutional Convention, he clearly
influenced the founders, particularly James Madison, and he thus repre-
sents an intellectual force that is a legitimate part of the current debate
over the relationship between government power and individual
property rights.
Id.
152 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
153 Id.
154 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
155 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down the refusal of municipal authorities to allow persons
of Chinese ancestry to operate laundries).
156 Id. at 369–70 (“When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of gov-
ernment, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.”).
157 Id. at 370 (“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of gov-
ernment, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts.”).
158 Id.
159 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 263 (1993) (stating that
the Warren Court “rewrote much of the corpus of American constitutional law”); Wilson R.
Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Huhn,
Roosevelt Court] (describing the achievements of the Roosevelt Court).
160 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extending the right of procedural due
process to the termination of welfare benefits by an administrative agency).
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protection,161 freedom of expression,162 and freedom of religion.163  As Justice
Jackson stated in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:164
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.165
In recent decades the Supreme Court has been particularly active in recognizing
different facets of the right to privacy, which it has described as the right of the indi-
vidual to make “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”166  In 2003 the Court stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to de-
fine one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.167
Another specific right that the Court has recognized that is a direct consequence
of the concept of individual sovereignty is the right of the individual to participate in
the political process on an equal basis with other persons.
D. Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule
The fourth idea that emerges from the principle of popular sovereignty is that
because every individual is a sovereign political actor, each individual therefore has
161 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official segregation
of the public schools).
162 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (imposing “actual malice”
test and other requirements in libel actions brought by public officials on account of statements
regarding their official duties).
163 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down
state law requiring the reading of Bible verses in the public schools).
164 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down children’s suspension from public school for refusing
to salute the American flag).
165 Id. at 638.
166 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
167 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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an equal right to participate in the political process.  Accordingly, the Constitution pro-
tects freedom of political expression,168 freedom of political association,169 and the
equal right to vote.170  In addition, the idea that each person possesses an equal amount
of sovereignty is the foundation for the principle of majority rule.171
By declaring that “all men are created equal,” the founders of this country re-
jected the concept that private individuals were entitled to exercise a hereditary form
of political power.172  The Enlightenment ideal of popular sovereignty represented
a break from the feudal concept of hereditary entitlement.  Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution prohibits the federal government from granting titles of nobility,173 and
Article I, Section 10 imposes the same prohibition on the states.174  However, the nor-
mative principle of equality was not exhausted with the establishment of a republic;
it has also proven useful in opposing arbitrary discrimination of any form.175  In his
168 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (overturning jury verdict
against newspaper that ran advertisement from civil rights organization describing police
treatment of civil rights demonstrators).
169 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down state court order
requiring NAACP to disclose names of members).
170 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment of
state legislative districts).
171 See Amar, Central Meaning, supra note 7, at 749 (“The central pillar of Republican
Government, I claim, is popular sovereignty.”); id. at 757 (“[T]his linkage between Repub-
licanism and majority rule runs throughout The Federalist Papers, and Founding era dis-
course . . . .”); id. at 753, 762–66 (citing James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton,
and other founders on the central importance of majority rule).
172 See Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual
Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739, 1742 (1992)
(“An important characteristic of the political feudal regime is that feudal leaders, within their
respective geographic areas, possess great discretion in their exercise of authority over depend-
ents who have sworn personal allegiance to their lords.”).
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 8.
174 Id. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
175 For example, Lincoln compared slavery to monarchy, stating that both institutions were
grounded in “the same tyrannical principle.” Abraham Lincoln, Seventh and Last Debate with
Senator Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Ill. (Oct. 15, 1858), reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 1, at 315. Lincoln stated:
That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this
country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be
silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and
wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have
stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue
to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the
divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops
itself. It is the same spirit that says, “You work and toil and earn bread,
and I’ll eat it.” No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth
of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live 
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dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson176 opposing state-sponsored racial segrega-
tion, Justice John Harlan noted (ruefully, defiantly, hopefully) that:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is
no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaran-
teed by the supreme law of the land are involved.177
Of all of the aspects of the principle of “popular sovereignty,” the matter of equal
political rights has undergone the greatest change and the most dramatic transformation
since the founding.  The Constitution originally provided that United States Senators
were to be appointed by the state legislatures;178 it still dangerously provides that Presi-
dential Electors are to be appointed in the manner directed by the state legislatures.179 
Only the members of the House of Representatives were to be elected by the people.180 
Furthermore, the franchise was limited to a small minority of the people; women,
blacks, and men without property were disenfranchised.181  The most numerous and
by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving
another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.
Id.
176 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
177 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . .”).
179 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).
180 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”).
181 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Property qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of our political structure.
In the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted one.”); id. at 684–85 (offering several
justifications for property qualifications and poll taxes). Justice Harlan stated:
[I]t is only by fiat that it can be said, especially in the context of American
history, that there can be no rational debate as to their advisability. Most
of the early Colonies had them; many of the States have had them during
much of their histories; and, whether one agrees or not, arguments have
been and still can be made in favor of them. For example, it is certainly
a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax promotes
civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about
public affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the
franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound
political theory by a large percentage of Americans through most of our
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obvious changes to the text of the Constitution over the intervening centuries have been
to broaden the franchise and strengthen our democracy.  The Fifteenth Amendment
extends the vote to blacks and other racial minorities;182 the Seventeenth Amendment
provides for the direct election of United States Senators;183 the Nineteenth Amendment
extends suffrage to women;184 the Twenty-third Amendment grants the residents of the
District of Columbia the right to vote for President;185 the Twenty-fourth Amendment
abolishes poll taxes in federal elections;186 and the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowers
the voting age in federal and state elections to eighteen years.187
In recent decades the Supreme Court has contributed to this process of democra-
tization by outlawing “white primaries,”188 banning poll taxes in state elections,189 in-
validating malapportionment schemes190 and striking down other devices intended to
deprive persons of equal opportunity to participate in the political process or to make
their vote less effective.191  Moreover, to permit meaningful participation by every per-
son in the political process, the Supreme Court now accords substantial protection
to the rights of political expression192 and political association,193 and has also struck
history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in commu-
nity affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more
knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means,
and that the community and Nation would be better managed if the
franchise were restricted to such citizens. Nondiscriminatory and fairly
applied literacy tests . . . find justification on very similar grounds.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Charles S. Daskow & David A. Sonner, Vox Populi: Is It Time
to Reform the Electoral College?, 55 FED. LAW. 33, 34–35 (2008) (describing differences in
number of qualified voters in different states at the time of the founding based on race and
property).
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
183 Id. amend. XVII.
184 Id. amend. XIX, § 1.
185 Id. amend. XXIII, § 1.
186 Id. amend. XXIV, § 1.
187 Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
188 See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the rules of the
Democratic Party of Texas forbidding blacks from voting in primary elections).
189 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax in state
elections).
190 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment scheme
for state legislative districts).
191 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (striking down at-large system of voting that
deprived blacks of representation in county government); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (striking down law redrawing boundaries of City of Tuskegee to exclude black
population).
192 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (finding that there is “a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open”).
193 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
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down barriers to equal opportunity for education.194  Additionally, the Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, landmark legislation that
opened the political process to blacks and other minorities.195  All of the foregoing
decisions strengthen our democratic institutions, which, according to John Hart Ely,
is a principal function of constitutional law.196  As the Supreme Court said in 1996 in
United States v. Virginia,197 “[a] prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the
story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored
or excluded.”198
The principle that every individual has an equal right to vote received its highest
expression in Reynolds v. Sims,199 which applied the previously-established principle
of “one person, one vote” to cases of malapportionment.200  In its decision, the Court
stated:
To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. . . .  A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor
no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.  This is the
clear and strong command of our Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause.  This is an essential part of the concept of a government
of laws and not men.  This is at the heart of Lincoln’s vision of
“government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people.” 
The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially
equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places
as well as of all races.201
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.”).
194 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering state to admit women to
state military college on an equal basis with men); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking
down state law requiring undocumented alien children to pay tuition to attend public school);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official racial segregation of the
public schools).
195 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding 1965 Voting Rights
Act as a valid enactment under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
196 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87–104 (1980) (setting forth the theory of “representation-reinforcement”).
197 518 U.S. 515 (ordering the state of Virginia to admit women to state military college on
the same basis as men).
198 Id. at 557.
199 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down apportionment scheme that permitted gross vari-
ations in numbers of persons among state legislative districts).
200 Id. at 558 (“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 672 U.S. 368,
381 (1963))).
201 377 U.S. at 567–68 (footnotes omitted).
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The Reynolds Court also linked the principle of equal rights of citizenship to the
concept of majority rule: “Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representa-
tive government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State
could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”202
Despite this substantial progress, barriers to equal participation still exist in the
political process.  A notable problem yet to be resolved is that of “political gerry-
mandering”—the Supreme Court has still failed to develop a legal standard for eval-
uating the constitutionality of districting schemes that deprive a political party of
representation proportionate to its voting strength.203  There is and no doubt always
will be tension between the principle of equality and discrepant custom204 or other legit-
imate objectives,205 but the tide of history has flowed strongly towards broadening
the franchise and removing obstacles to full and complete political equality.
E. Separation of Church and State
Because the right to rule arises from the will of the people and not from God,
the principle of popular sovereignty necessarily implies the separation of church and
state.206  The dominions of church and state are distinct because their powers are
derived from different sources of authority.207
The dispute over separation of church and state in America traces back to the
earliest colonial days.  Within a few years of their arrival on these shores, two groups
of Massachusetts Puritans contended over the proper role of religion in the govern-
ment of the colony.208  On the one side was the ruling oligarchy of Massachusetts led
by Governor John Winthrop; on the other stood Roger Williams and other religious
dissenters.209  Historian James Ernst describes the conflict as centering on the dual
principles of popular sovereignty and separation of church and state:
202 Id. at 565.
203 See League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (failing to agree upon
a standard for evaluating the constitutionality of politically-gerrymandered districts).
204 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (requiring each state to have equal representation in the
United States Senate); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (setting number of presidential electors from each
state to equal number of senators and representatives combined).
205 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding state law
requiring government issued photo identification to vote).
206 See Jónatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 451, 459 (2005) (“John Locke articulates a consistent political theory
based on individual autonomy, popular sovereignty, limited government, separation of powers
and separation of Church and State.”).
207 Id. at 452 (describing sources of authority for the separate dominions of church and state).
208 See generally JAMES ERNST, ROGER WILLIAMS: NEW ENGLAND FIREBRAND 97–137
(1932) (describing the conflict between Roger Williams and the authorities of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony).
209 Id. at 136.
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The Bay was for a union of church and state with the church in
authority; [Williams] was for complete severance of church and
civil state with the church subordinate in civil things.  The Bay
was a theocracy and an oligarchy; he upheld the sovereignty of
the people and the rights of man and “right reason.”210
The authorities of Massachusetts Bay accused dissenters, such as Roger Williams
and Anne Hutchinson, of the crime of heresy, and exiled them upon conviction.211 
These actions only increased the Colony’s thirst for purity.  Two decades later, the Bay
Colony executed four Quakers.212  A generation later, in 1692, a general madness over-
came the Massachusetts Puritans, and they executed twenty persons at Salem whom
they thought to be witches.213  The Puritans felt justified in inflicting these punish-
ments because they believed that the laws against heresy and witchcraft reflected the
will of God.214
In contrast to the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Roger Williams, the
founder of Rhode Island, argued that the people are sovereign.  In 1644, he wrote: “the
sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the people . . . .”215  The same
year he also coined the phrase “separation of church and state,” arguing that the leaders
of Massachusetts Bay had made a fateful error in mixing the two institutions: “[W]hen
[the Church] have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden
of the Church and the Wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall
itself . . . and made His Garden a Wilderness as at this day.”216  Roger Williams
welcomed people of all faiths, including Jews, to settle in Rhode Island.217
210 Id.
211 See id. at 134 (sentence of banishment pronounced upon Williams); id. at 211 (Anne
Hutchinson and about thirty of her followers banished in 1638).
212 Id. at 375.
213 See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome
and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (2001)
(describing the Salem witch trials).
214 Id. at 49.
215 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE,
DISCUSSED, IN A CONFERENCE BETWEENE TRUTH AND PEACE (1644), reprinted in PERRY
MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 147 (1953).
216 Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 52
n.73 (2006) (quoting Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton’s Letter Examined and Answered (1644));
see also id. at 52 (noting that “Roger Williams coined the phrase ‘wall of separation’”); ERNST,
supra note 208, at 279 (“The political program of Roger Williams called for absolute liberty
of conscience, separation of church and state, and people’s sovereignty, that is, government by
consent of the governed of all classes . . . .”). But see PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND
MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 454 (1954) (“Even Roger Williams’ assertion of toler-
ation came not from a political or constitutional scruple but from a conception of the spiritual
life so exalted that he could not see it contaminated by earthly compulsion.”).
217 See ERNST, supra note 208, at 350 (speaking of the Jews, Williams stated it was the
duty of the chief magistrate of the colony to “make way for their free and peaceable habitation
amongst us”).
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The same battle over separation of church and state was waged again in the 1780s
in the newly-founded State of Virginia.  This time the protagonists were Governor
Patrick Henry on one side and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson on the other.218 
Governor Henry proposed a law that would have imposed a tax for the support of the
teachers of Christian education.219  Madison and Jefferson opposed this law, and in-
stead they secured the passage of Jefferson’s famous Bill for Religious Liberty.220  The
following year, the framers of the Constitution adopted a provision abolishing any
religious test for holding public office,221 and two years after that Congress adopted
the First Amendment, which commences with the words: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”222
As with almost all of our rights, the right to separation of church and state lay dor-
mant in the courts until the accession of the Roosevelt Court.223  In 1940, the Supreme
Court incorporated the Religion Clauses into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,224 and in 1947 Justice Hugo Black issued his famous opinion in Everson
v. Board of Education, finding that the Establishment Clause demands the separation
of church and state.225  Subsequent cases adopted the rule that the government must
218 See CHARLES CERAMI, YOUNG PATRIOTS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF TWO MEN,
THEIR IMPOSSIBLE PLAN, AND THE REVOLUTION THAT CREATED THE CONSTITUTION 61–64
(2005) (describing the conflict over Henry’s bill to provide an annual contribution to support
the Christian religion).
219 Id. at 61–62.
220 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1947) (describing the efforts of Madison
and Jefferson in opposing the tax and securing the enactment of the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, (1786),
reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 34, at 301–03 (“Almighty God hath created the
mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens . . . are a de-
parture from the plan of the Holy author of our religion. . . . No man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry . . . or shall otherwise suffer on
account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argu-
ment to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion . . . .”); JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL
AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in FOUNDING
AMERICA, supra note 34, at 295 (“[W]e hold it for a fundamental and unalienable truth, ‘that
religion, or the duty which we owe to the Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be
directed only by reason and conviction . . . , not by force or violence.’ The religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”).
221 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
222 U.S. CONST. amend I.
223 See Huhn, Roosevelt Court, supra note 159.
224 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (ruling that the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are among the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
225 Everson, 330 U.S., at 16 (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”
(citation omitted)).
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remain neutral with respect to religion;226 later still, the Court embraced the standard
that the government may not endorse religion.227  Over the past seven decades, the
Supreme Court has issued numerous opinions regarding government-sponsored
prayer,228 the display of religious imagery on public land,229 and public funding to
religious institutions.230
In my opinion, the single most important question that the Court has faced in the
area of Separation of Church and State is whether the government has a legitimate in-
terest in enforcing religiously motivated moral norms.  This question frequently arises
in right to privacy cases because many religious organizations take strong positions
on issues such as abortion and equal marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples.231 
In his opinion dissenting from the decision of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick232 to
uphold the constitutionality of a state statute making sodomy a crime, Justice Harry
Blackmun argued that the state’s invocation of religious authority in support of the
statute actually undermined the constitutionality of the law:
The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether
the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its
226 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (citations omitted)).
227 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (adopting
the standard that the government may not “endorse” religion).
228 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down practice of prayer at
public school graduation).
229 See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (ordering removal of display of Ten Command-
ments from county courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (permitting display
of statue of Ten Commandments on statehouse grounds).
230 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding parental voucher
option as applied to public, charter, private, and parochial schools).
231 See Editorial, The Myths of Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at A31 (opposing
Proposition 8 and stating, “Religions and their believers are free to define marriage as they
please; they are free to consider homosexuality a sin. But they are not free to impose their
definitions of morality on the state.”); Janet Hook & Noam N. Levey, Health Bill Picking Up
Key Votes: Some Reluctant Democrats Fall into Line, and a Coalition of Nuns Gives Its
Support, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at AA1 (noting that the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops had put out a statement opposing the health care reform bill in Congress because the
proposed law inadequately protected against the use of federal funds to finance abortions);
Letter from the First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to Church
Leaders in California (June 30, 2008), available at http://newsroom.lds.org/ldsnewsroom/
eng/commentary/california-and-same-sex-marriage; William F. Murphy et al., Health Care
for Life and for All, ON FAITH, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2010, 3:30 AM), http://newsweek
.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/03/health_care_for_life_and_for_all.html
(opposing health care reform on the ground that the bill inadequately protects against the use
of federal funds to pay for abortions).
232 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law criminalizing consensual acts of sodomy as
applied to homosexuals).
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conformity to religious doctrine.  Thus, far from buttressing his
case, petitioner’s invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas
Aquinas, and sodomy’s heretical status during the Middle Ages
undermines his suggestion that [the statute] represents a legitimate
use of secular coercive power.  A State can no more punish pri-
vate behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish
such behavior because of racial animus.233
Justice Blackmun’s position in Bowers reflects the fact that in the United States
religious authority is not law.  American lawyers and judges do not cite scripture or
the statements of religious leaders as authority for what the law is.  Neither the Bible,
the Koran, nor the Torah may be legitimately invoked in determining the validity or
the interpretation of regulations, ordinances, statutes, or constitutional provisions.  The
proper interpretation of American law depends upon the intent of the people who wrote
or adopted the law, not the presumed intent of God.  To the extent that the Court’s
decision in Bowers was based upon religious custom, it conflicted with the equally
longstanding custom of not relying upon religious authority to interpret the law.
Seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas234 the Supreme Court reversed Bowers,
but it did not adopt Justice Blackmun’s reasoning condemning religious intolerance. 
Instead, the majority expressly adopted the reasoning that Justice John Paul Stevens
had articulated in his dissenting opinion in Bowers that “the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”235  In her concurring
opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor expressed a similar view that “moral disap-
proval” by itself is an illegitimate basis for such laws.236  By contrast, Justice Antonin
Scalia takes the position that the majority of the people have the right to enact their
moral and religious views into law.237  The proper role of morality and religion will
remain at the center of the debate over the constitutionality of laws affecting the right
to privacy.
In the present day the debate over popular sovereignty and the separation of church
and state defines the conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and western democracy. 
233 Id. at 211–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
234 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state law making same-sex intercourse a crime).
235 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
236 Id. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 583 (“Moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal
classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
237 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia would have upheld
the state constitutional amendment prohibiting the enactment of nondiscrimination laws pro-
tecting gays and lesbians on the ground that the amendment represents an attempt to “preserve
traditional sexual mores.”).
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Popular sovereignty is anathema to Islamic fundamentalists precisely because it re-
quires the separation of church and state.238  Islamists sincerely believe that the law of
man may not contradict the law of God.239  The influential Islamist political author
Sayyid Qutb wrote:
This religion [Islam] is really a universal declaration of the free-
dom of man from servitude to other men and from servitude to his
own desires, which is also a form of human servitude; it is a dec-
laration that sovereignty belongs to God alone and that He is the
Lord of all the worlds.  It means a challenge to all kinds and forms
of systems which are based on the concept of the sovereignty of
man; in other words, where man has usurped the Divine attribute. 
Any system in which the final decisions are referred to human be-
ings, and in which the sources of all authority are human, deifies
human beings by designating others than God as lords over men. 
This declaration means that the usurped authority of God be re-
turned to Him and the usurpers be thrown out—those who by
themselves devise laws for others to follow, thus elevating them-
selves to the status of lords and reducing others to the status of
slaves.  In short, to proclaim the authority and sovereignty of God
means to eliminate all human kingship and to announce the rule
of the Sustainer of the universe over the entire earth.240
Professor Kent Gravelle has observed: “Although it may be difficult for a West-
erner to understand, in an Islamic state, the government, religion, and law are insep-
arable.”241  The refusal of Islamists to accept the principles of popular sovereignty and
the separation of church and state—their fear that these principles are incompatible
with Islam—is a principal cause of their failure to enter the modern world.242
However, the battle for the future of Muslim society—the dream of Islamic democ-
racy—is slowly making headway.243  In contrast to Qutb, Tassaduq Hussain Jillani,
238 SAYYID QUTB, MILESTONES 58 (Unity Publ’g Co. rev. ed. 1981).
239 See id.; Kent Benedict Gravelle, Islamic Law in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis, 5
I.L.S.A.J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1998).
240 QUTB, supra note 238, at 58.
241 Gravelle, supra note 239, at 1–2 (identifying four groupings of countries depending
upon how strictly each country applies Islamic law).
242 See, e.g., FATIMA MERNISSI, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: FEAR OF THE MODERN WORLD
(Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1992) (describing how many Muslims have rejected modernity in
reaction to the humiliation and frustration that they experienced during the period of colo-
nialism, and how they do not trust the institution of democracy because it is a western ideal).
243 See Fareed Zakaria, The Jihad Against the Jihadis: How Muslim Leaders Waged War
on Extremists—and Won, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 26 (“In most Muslim nations, main-
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has argued that Islam is consonant with
democracy.244  Justice Jillani has stated that “although sovereignty theoretically lies
with God Almighty, man has been made a deputy of divine authority—a delegatee of
that power.  The delegatees—in this case the people—in turn elect their assembly who,
for all practical purposes, exercise the divinely delegated political power as a polity.”245
Qutb and Jillani are treading the same path taken by Winthrop, Williams, Henry,
and Madison as they seek to reconcile religious devotion with self-government.  As
the principle of popular sovereignty gathers support in the Muslim world, recognition
of the principle of separation of church and state will inevitably follow.
F. The Power of the National Government Over the States
Two decades ago, in his brilliant essay Of Sovereignty and Federalism, Akhil
Amar drew the distinction between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty and
persuasively argued that this Nation was founded upon the latter and not the former.246 
There is abundant evidence to support this proposition, including the dramatic differ-
ences between the Articles of Confederation and the text of the Constitution;247 state-
ments of drafters such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and James Wilson;248
early decisions by the Supreme Court authored by John Marshall249 and Joseph
stream rulers have stabilized their regimes and their societies, and extremists have been
isolated. This has not led to the flowering of Jeffersonian democracy or liberalism. But modern,
somewhat secular forces are clearly in control and widely supported across the Muslim world.
Polls, elections, and in-depth studies all confirm this trend.”).
244 See Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the
Twenty-First Century, 2006 BYU L. REV. 727 (2006) (arguing that Islam is compatible with
democracy).
245 Id. at 735.
246 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) [herein-
after Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism].
247 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. But see Kurt Lash, The Original Meaning
of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated
Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1891–92 (2008) (contending that courts and commen-
tators are “almost certainly wrong” in concluding that the omission of the word “expressly”
in the Tenth Amendment means that the framers intended for the national government to have
more implied powers than under the Articles of Confederation).
248 See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 246, at 1437.
249 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402–04 (1819).
In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of Maryland
have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the consti-
tution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from the people, but
as the act of sovereign and independent States.
. . . .
From these Conventions the constitution derives its whole authority.
The government proceeds directly from the people; is “ordained and
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Story;250 and famous speeches by Daniel Webster251 and Abraham Lincoln.252  All
this evidence supports the basic idea that the Constitution emanated from the people
and not from the states.  This understanding animated not only the adoption of the
Constitution but also the defense of the Union in the Civil War.253
Despite this persuasive evidence supporting the primacy of popular sovereignty,
throughout American history there have been elements who insist on elevating the op-
posing principle of “state sovereignty.”  During the antebellum period “states rights”
became the battle cry of nullifiers and secessionists in support of slavery.254  After the
Civil War, state sovereignty remained the principal argument in opposition to the pro-
tection of newly-freed slaves,255 and “states rights” was the constant refrain of segre-
gationists up to and throughout the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.256 
established” in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained,
“in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic
tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their
posterity.” The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is im-
plied in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and
their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be nega-
tived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus adopted,
was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties.
Id.
250 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816) (“The constitution
of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capac-
ities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United
States.’”).
251 See Senator Daniel Webster, The Constitution Not a Compact Between Sovereign States,
Speech Before the Senate (Feb. 16, 1833), in 3 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 448, 479–86
(Boston, C.C. Little and J. Brown 1851).
252 See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 65.
255 See Wilson Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in
Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1073–79 (2009) (contending that the
Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of the State Action Doctrine, leaving blacks unpro-
tected in their fundamental rights); Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle
of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1427–51 (2006) (arguing that the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to grant Congress the power to prevent private parties
from interfering with fundamental rights, at least in the event that the states failed to act).
256 See, e.g., Governor George C. Wallace, Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at
http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/InauguralSpeech.html. Governor Wallace said:
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, and took
an oath to my people. It is very appropriate then that from this Cradle of
the Confederacy, this very Heart of the Great Anglo-Saxon Southland,
that today we sound the drum for freedom as have our generations of
forebears before us done, time and time again through history. Let us
rise to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and send our answer
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In the late nineteenth century, these racists were joined by industrialists seeking im-
munity from federal laws outlawing abusive practices such as monopolization and
child labor,257 and for fifty years the Supreme Court enthusiastically enforced their
agenda under the banner of “state sovereignty.”258  Not until the mid-twentieth century
did the Roosevelt Court and the Warren Court recognize Congress’s power to adopt
laws protecting workers and racial minorities.259  Historically, “state sovereignty” was
used to diminish the right of the American people to defend themselves from oppres-
sion.  As Akhil Amar so eloquently described these cases, “[w]henever the rhetoric of
‘states’ rights’ is deployed to defend states’ wrongs, our servants have become our
masters; our rescuers, our captors.”260
to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South. In the name of the
greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust
and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . . and I say . . . segre-
gation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever.
. . . .
This nation was never meant to be a unit of one . . . but a united of
the many . . . . that is the exact reason our freedom loving forefathers
established the states, so as to divide the rights and powers among the
states, insuring that no central power could gain master government
control.
. . . .
And so it was meant in our racial lives . . . each race, within its own
framework has the freedom to teach . . to instruct . . to develop . . to ask
for and receive deserved help from others of separate racial stations. This
is the great freedom of our American founding fathers . . . but if we amal-
gamate into the one unit as advocated by the communist philosophers . . .
then the enrichment of our lives . . . the freedom for our development . . .
is gone forever. We become, therefore, a mongrel unit of one under a
single all powerful government . . . and we stand for everything . . . and
for nothing.
Id.
257 See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, Is Government the Problem or the Solution?, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 502 (1996) (“[T]he Republican Party came to regard a strong federal
government as a danger to corporate ascendancy . . . .”).
258 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down National Industrial Recovery Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (striking down federal Child Labor Law); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895) (striking down the Sherman Antitrust Act as applied to manufacturing); SCHWARTZ,
supra note 159, at 182–84, 212–13, 232 (1993) (describing decisions of Supreme Court
narrowly construing the power of Congress over interstate commerce).
259 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding power
of Congress to enact Civil Rights Act of 1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding power of Congress to enact the National Labor Relations Act);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 237, 242–43 (describing decisions upholding Congress’s
power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause).
260 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 246, at 1520.
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In recent years the Supreme Court has revived the concept of “state sovereignty,”261
describing the principle as “a fundamental postulate [ ] implicit in the constitutional
design.”262  As Professor Timothy Zick has pointed out in a number of articles, this
terminology has a rhetorical purpose.263  To speak of “state sovereignty” is to con-
fuse a State with a Nation, and to speak of “states’ rights” is to confuse a State with
an individual.264  In the service of this doctrine the Court has placed certain limits on
the scope of Congress’s power.  It has struck down some legislation on the ground that
it exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause265 and Section Five of the
261 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject
state to suit in state courts without its consent); Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, supra note
8, at 243–47 (describing the history of the concept of “state sovereignty” in the Supreme
Court). But see Terrence M. Messonnier, A Neo-Federalist Interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, 25 AKRON L. REV. 213 (1991) (interpreting the Tenth Amendment as recogniz-
ing the principle of state sovereignty).
262 Alden, 527 U.S. at 729; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“We enforce the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority not
for their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist
system of government.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he intrusion [on state sovereignty] is significant” and “contradicts the fed-
eral balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce . . . .”); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (“Whether one views the take title provision as
lying outside Congress’ enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal struc-
ture of our Government established by the Constitution.”). But see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify
principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers
over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”).
263 See Timothy Zick, Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 541, 543
(2007) [hereinafter Zick, Active Sovereignty] (“Sovereignty has enormous rhetorical power.”);
Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, supra note 8.
264 Professor Zick states:
The core of the federalism revival has been the transformation of
states, from something akin to corporate forms to far more dignified
nations or persons. Almost by sheer linguistic fiat, the Court has be-
stowed on states not only the inherent “dignity” of nations or persons,
but a host of constitutional rights as well. Today states, like nations and
persons, have “rights” to privacy, autonomy, equality, and due process.
Nothing in the Constitution itself mandated this change in status. It is the
result of what the Court itself has called “background principles” and
constitutional and historical suppositions. Dignity, esteem, and the new
states’ rights are, the Court has said, inherent attributes of statehood.
They follow naturally from the fact of being what the Constitution mini-
mally refers to as a “state.”
Zick, Active Sovereignty, supra note 263, at 552.
265 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against
Women Act as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
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Fourteenth Amendment;266 it has ruled that state officials may not be “commandeered”
to enforce provisions of federal law;267 and it has invoked the concept of “state sover-
eignty” to limit the power of Congress to enact laws granting individuals wronged by
the state an action for money damages.268
A practical justification for the principle of state sovereignty is that if the states
are permitted to experiment with legal and social innovations, other states or the fed-
eral government may learn from their experience.  As Justice Louis Brandeis stated in
this oft-quoted passage from his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.269
These words were quoted most recently by Justice O’Connor in her dissenting opinion
in Gonzales v. Raich, arguing that the states should have the freedom to adopt laws
permitting the medical use of marijuana.270
There is one area where the states clearly are not sovereign.  Ever since the case
of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,271 it has been understood that the
states have no authority in matters of foreign affairs because they lack “sovereignty”
with respect to foreign nations.272  Even during a time when the Supreme Court lim-
ited the authority of Congress to enact statutes regulating interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court upheld a treaty that governed the treatment of migratory birds.273 
266 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
267 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officers to run back-
ground checks on gun buyers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down
a provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on
the ground that the law required state legislatures to take title to radioactive waste).
268 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
269 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
270 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
271 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding law delegating power to President to determine whether
it would be a criminal offense to sell arms to the combatants in a South American conflict).
272 Id. at 316 (“As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as a
unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally,
but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.”);
see also id. at 316–17 (discussing sovereignty theory at length).
273 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (“To answer this question it is not enough
to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States,
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During this same period the Court often struck down laws making broad delegations
of authority to the Executive Branch but upheld a law conferring broad discretion on
the President to make it illegal to sell arms to the participants of a conflict in South
America.274  In recent decades the Court has struck down a number of state laws deny-
ing equal benefits to aliens—even undocumented aliens—on the ground that only the
federal government has authority to regulate immigration and naturalization.275  The
principle of state sovereignty presents no barrier to the enforcement of international
law;276 however, the principle of national sovereignty does.  That is the subject of the
following portion of this article.
G. National Independence and the Changing Role of International Law
The seventh and final manifestation of the principle of popular sovereignty is
that the American people as a whole are sovereign and are therefore independent of
any foreign power.  Even though the founding generation relied upon principles of
international law in declaring our independence,277 Americans resist the notion that
because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI
treaties made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws
of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land.”).
274 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (1936) (“It is important to bear in mind that
we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of leg-
islative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”).
275 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down state law requiring children
of undocumented aliens to pay tuition to attend public schools); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down state welfare laws discriminating against non-citizens).
276 But see Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (finding that ruling of International
Court of Justice, which held that United States had violated Vienna Convention by failing
to notify criminal defendant of his rights under the Convention, did not preempt state laws
governing challenges to criminal convictions).
277 See Cindy G. Buys, Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich
Response to the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 15–16 (2007) [hereinafter Buys, Burying]. Professor Buys states:
Two areas of international law were particularly relevant to the
creation and development of the United States as a constitutional gov-
ernment and its protection of individual rights. First, the international
law concept of sovereignty helped the fledgling United States to gain
international recognition and imposed obligations on the federal gov-
ernment vis-à-vis other nations, as well as towards its own subjects. . . .
Second, the evolution of the meaning of sovereignty paralleled the de-
velopment of international human rights law.
Id.
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domestic law may be overridden by international law.278  Opposition to international
law is based upon the idea that the invocation of treaty provisions, orders of interna-
tional bodies, or the interpretations of the law by foreign tribunals all diminish the
sovereignty of the American people.279
As a consequence, American courts have developed a number of doctrines that
diminish the effectiveness of international law.  These include the concept of non-self-
executing treaties;280 the deference granted to the executive branch in the interpretation
of treaties;281 the power of Congress to revoke a treaty;282 and the power of the President
to unilaterally abrogate treaty obligations.283  Finally, in the area of constitutional in-
terpretation, the Supreme Court has been slow to rely upon constitutional authority
handed down by constitutional courts from other countries.284
278 See Zachary Larsen, Discounting Foreign Imports: Foreign Authority in Constitutional
Interpretation & the Curb of Popular Sovereignty, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767, 778 (2009).
279 See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: HOW AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998)
(opposing growing influence of international law); JEROME R. CORSI, AMERICA FOR SALE:
FIGHTING THE NEW WORLD ORDER, SURVIVING A GLOBAL DEPRESSION, AND PRESERVING
U.S.A. SOVEREIGNTY (2009) (same); KRASNER, supra note 20, at 125 (characterizing the
invocation of national sovereignty against external influences of international human rights
laws as “organized hypocrisy” and noting “Many contemporary observers have seen human
rights as an issue area in which conventional notions of sovereignty have been compromised.
They are right.”); NATHAN TABOR, THE BEAST ON THE EAST RIVER: THE UN THREAT TO
AMERICA’S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY (2006); Larsen, supra note 278, at 769 (“[R]eliance
upon foreign and international law in construing constitutional provisions for purposes of
judicial review should be rejected . . . .”).
280 See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (finding the Vienna Convention to be a non-self-executing
treaty, and refusing to accord domestic effect to the decision of the International Court of
Justice enforcing the Convention); David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the
Domestic Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 488 (2010) (discussing the
non-self-execution doctrine); id. at 507 (“Medellín directly limits the domestic role of treaties
in U.S. courts and indirectly undermines reliance on [customary international law] by the
federal judiciary.”).
281 See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 87 (2009) (“[L]egal doctrine has long called for especially strong foreign
affairs deference to the Executive.”). But see David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm
for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008) (describing what he views in Medellín
as a break from past practice in treaty interpretation).
282 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (“[A]n Act of Congress, which must comply
with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is sub-
sequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the
treaty null.”).
283 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to overturn unilateral decision of
President to abrogate self-defense treaty with Taiwan after he recognized Communist China
as the legitimate government of China).
284 See Buys, Burying, supra note 277, at 1. Professor Buys states:
In the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several
high-profile opinions that refer to international and foreign law, igniting
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International law is steadily becoming more important in two areas: international
trade and human rights.285  In my opinion, it is likely that due to globalization, busi-
nesses will demand that there be uniform laws in order to facilitate the creation of a
worldwide market for their goods and services.  Similarly, consumers will demand
access to information and freedom from dangerous products wherever they are pro-
duced, and workers will seek to eliminate unfair practices in competing labor markets
around the world.  Businesses, workers, and consumers will all demand the elimina-
tion of abusive practices and unfair methods of competition.286
In the context of human rights there will also be a demand for greater and more
uniform protection.  As noted above, during the administration of George W. Bush,
Justice Department officials issued opinions promoting the doctrine of “the unitary
executive,” in which they asserted that the President could ignore existing treaties gov-
erning the detention and treatment of prisoners, either because those treaties did not
apply or because the Constitution authorized the President to ignore them.287  The
a heated debate among the justices, legal scholars, politicians, and com-
mentators regarding the proper use of international and foreign law in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice Scalia, usually joined by Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, has led the fight against the use of
foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for constitu-
tional decision-making. Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, O’Connor,
Souter, Stevens, and White have asserted that international and foreign
law have relevance to their work and that it is not inappropriate to refer
to such sources in their decision-making.
Id. (citations omitted).
285 See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and
Future, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 797 (2003) (examining increase in scholarly commentary on human
rights law and international trade law).
286 See Cindy Galway Buys, The United States Supreme Court Misses the Mark: Towards
Better Implementation of the United States’ International Obligations, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L.
39, 40 (2008) (“[T]reaty-based obligations increasingly affect relations between the United
States and its sub-federal units of government, in part because the subject matter of these
treaties is expanding into areas traditionally regulated by the states. Non-state actors, such as
individuals and businesses, frequently find that they also are directly affected by these inter-
national agreements.”); id. at 76 (“Given current trends, it appears highly likely that the United
States and its citizens will be interacting more and more with other actors from around the
world. As this trend towards globalization continues, the United States will increasingly be
forced to determine how it will comply with various international obligations it may under-
take to facilitate international trade and travel and other relations.”); see also Kenneth M.
Casebeer, The Power to Regulate “Commerce with Foreign Nations” in a Global Economy
and the Future of American Democracy: An Essay, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 25, 42 (2001) (argu-
ing that the Rehnquist Court would interfere with America’s ability to negotiate international
agreements regulating the global economy, stating, “the Lopez opinion stands as a potentially
crippling barrier to competitiveness in nation-state negotiation over the terms of political
control of the globalized market”).
287 See supra note 142.
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Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation of the power of the President, ruling
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld288 that the President is bound by the provisions of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice289 and that the prisoner was entitled to a trial that was con-
sistent with the mandates of the Geneva Conventions.290
As the nations of the world become more involved in each other’s affairs, ques-
tions of international law are bound to arise more and more frequently, both in the area
of economic regulation and in the area of human rights.  Just as power over business
regulation and civil rights passed from the states to the national government after 1937
in the United States,291 so too in the next century governmental power will inevitably
pass to international bodies, which are the only entities capable of dealing with prob-
lems such as global warming, slave labor, or torture of prisoners.
In my opinion, America and other nations will become reconciled to a regime of
international law to the extent that such a system is congruent with the overarching
principle of popular sovereignty.  If international law is perceived as diminishing the
freedom and independence of the American people, we should expect our citizens to
continue to reject its legitimacy in the name of national sovereignty.292  In contrast, if
international law is understood as expressing the will of the people—if it reinforces
principles of limited government and protects individual rights—if it is employed to
restrain the actions of terrorist organizations that kill and maim civilians, multinational
corporations that engage in abusive business practices, and rogue states that threaten
the peace—international law will be accepted as a vital instrument in promoting equal
justice under law.293
288 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (granting prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus relief).
289 Id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congres-
sional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”).
290 See id. at 625 (ruling that the trial of petitioner violated the Geneva Conventions).
291 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941) (describing the
Court’s shift towards upholding the constitutionality of commercial and social legislation);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 234 (“A remarkable reversal in the Supreme Court’s attitude
toward the New Deal program took place early in 1937.”).
292 See Larsen, supra note 278. With respect to the related question of whether the
Constitution accords rights to all of humanity, see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical
Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 487–88 (2007). The author states:
Although many Founders may have believed that “all men” were
naturally equal in their God-given rights-bearing capacity, as the Decla-
ration of Independence suggested, it does not necessarily follow that they
also thought that the government created by the U.S. Constitution would
protect and enforce the constitutional rights of all men everywhere. . . .
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Founders approached the task of
writing a constitution or bill of rights in 1787–1789 with the intent to
enshrine natural rights of all mankind.
Id.
293 See Knowles, supra note 281, at 87 (proposing a “hegemony” theory under which
American courts would lend legitimacy and stability to international law by ending deference
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CONCLUSION
In the Declaration of Independence, the founders of this Nation recognized the
consent of the people as the legitimate source of all political power.294  Their under-
standing of the concept of popular sovereignty is embodied by a number of interre-
lated and mutually supporting principles, including the rule of law, limited government,
individual sovereignty, equal political rights, Separation of Church and State, limited
state sovereignty, and national sovereignty.  The Constitution—“the voice of the whole
American people”295—made these principles into law.
But these principles were incompletely recognized at the founding.  At that time,
democracy was circumscribed by the twin facts that relatively few federal officers
were elected directly by the people and relatively few citizens enjoyed the right to
vote.  The states were not subject to the Bill of Rights and were therefore free to de-
prive their residents of even the most elemental rights.  The Constitution expressly
countenanced slavery.
Even after slavery was abolished and the states were made subject to the
Constitution, the Supreme Court failed to enforce its provisions.  For one hundred and
fifty years after the Constitution was written and for seventy years after the Fourteenth
Amendment was approved in Congress, the Supreme Court was reluctant to recog-
nize and protect even those individual rights which were explicitly set forth in the
Constitution.
As Edmund Morgan stated, however, the ideal of popular sovereignty has “con-
tinually challenged” our society “to reform the facts of political and social existence
to fit the aspirations it fosters.”296  In the centuries since the founding, and particularly
since the investment of the Roosevelt Court in 1937, the interrelated principles of
popular sovereignty have undergone enormous transformation.  Although the govern-
ment exercises broad new powers, its exercise of those powers is subject to the rule
of law in the form of constitutional restraint including the separation of powers.  The
to the executive branch interpretation of it); see also Buys, Burying, supra note 277, at 54
(suggesting that sovereignty theory indicates that the courts should give effect to international
law when it expands human rights). Buys states:
Under the dictates of sovereignty theory, the Court would never be
forced to adopt a foreign practice that is less protective of the people
because that would be contrary to the entire purpose for which the gov-
ernment was created. Rather, the Supreme Court should continue to use
foreign and international law to expand our conception of human rights
consistently with the Constitution and should use international law as
an interpretive and educational tool in appropriate circumstances as
outlined above.
Id.
294 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
295 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816).
296 See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 306.
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Supreme Court now protects the rights of the individual, including the right to partic-
ipate in the democratic process on an equal basis with other persons.  The Separation
of Church and State is now enforced, and the will of the whole American people as
represented in Congress has largely achieved ascendancy over the sovereignty of the
states.  Looking to the future, international law seems destined to play a greater role in
our society.  Its acceptance and concomitant success will depend upon the extent to
which it reflects the myriad values represented by the principle of popular sovereignty.
